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Abstract
Analogical reasoning plays an important role in the
context of higher cognitive abilities of humans. Analo-
gies can be used not only to explain reasoning abilities
of humans, but also to explain learning from sparse
data, creative problem solving, abstractions of con-
crete situations, and recognition of formerly unseen
situations, just to mention some examples. Research
in AI and cognitive science has been proposing sev-
eral dierent models of analogy making. Nevertheless,
no approach for a model theoretic semantics of anal-
ogy making is currently available. This paper gives
an analysis of the meaning (the semantics) of analogi-
cal relations that are computed by the analogy engine
HDTP (Heuristic-Driven Theory Projection).
Introduction
Humans show remarkable higher cognitive abilities
comprising not only (abstract) types of reasoning,
learning from sparse data, and planning, but also the
ability to creatively nding new conceptualizations of
an unknown domain, to solve problems based on simi-
lar solutions for other problems, and to recognize and
categorize perceptual input that was never seen before.
At least to a certain extent it is possible to explain and
to model such types of higher cognitive abilities with
frameworks for analogical reasoning (GHK01).
Because of the wide range of applicability of anal-
ogy making mechanisms for the explanation of vari-
ous higher cognitive abilities, analogies are of interest
not only for articial intelligence and cognitive science,
but also for articial general intelligence. Classical AI
methodologies suer from various deciencies that re-
sult from highly specialized models. For example, it
is hard to nd uniform frameworks for the variety of
dierent reasoning types (GKSK09), for creativity as-
pects of human cognition (Ind92), or for problem solv-
ing in unknown situations (GP07). As a consequence
of these deciencies the desired generalization capabil-
ities of appropriate AGI systems are currently far from
being reachable. To tackle this problem we propose the
usage of analogy mechanisms for AGI systems.
Frameworks for analogy making cover a large part
of cognitive abilities that are usually considered to be
central for AGI systems. A good source to support this
claim is (KHG09) where analogies are used to model
aspects of reasoning, creativity, problem solving, learn-
ing, perception, or motor control, just to mention some
of them. Furthermore, even from a more abstract per-
spective the establishment of analogical relations seems
to be one of the rare possibilities to explain many cog-
nitive phenomena in a uniform way: quite often we act
(alternatively perceive, reason, learn etc.) as if we were
in another (well-known and analogous) situation. It
rarely happens that humans can reason in a purely de-
ductive (abductive, inductive etc.) way to act in real
life. A natural description of such cognitive phenomena
can be provided by analogies, because vagueness, learn-
ing, and the transfer of knowledge about old situations
to new ones are intrinsically embedded in the very idea
of analogy making.
Due to the fact that analogies are considered to be a
central mechanism of human cognition and intelligence,
a number of models have be proposed to explain dier-
ent aspects of analogies, varying in complexity and in
their degree of formalization. A few examples of such
frameworks are SME (FFG89), interactionism (DIS03),
LISA (HH96), Copycat (Hof95), and AMBR / DUAL
(KP01).1 Most of these analogy making models use spe-
cial means for representation and computation of ana-
logical inferences. For example, the structure mapping
engine (FFG89), probably the currently best known
analogy model, uses a graph-based representation and
a heuristic-governed matching algorithm.
Although, we can conclude that there is a broad vari-
ety of dierent computational models, it is hard to nd
a spelled out semantics of analogical relations computed
by algorithmic models. Even worse, for all established
frameworks even an endeavor to nd a semantics of the
underlying computations cannot be found. However,
from an AGI perspective, it would be desirable to have
a model that could be combined with standard mecha-
nisms of knowledge representation and reasoning.
1A good overview of various theoretical and practical ap-
proaches for the modeling of analogy making can be fur-
thermore found in the special issue of Cognitive Systems
Research about analogical reasoning as a means for the in-
tegration of cognitive abilities (SKK09).In this paper, we will discuss heuristic-driven the-
ory projection (HDTP), a formal framework to com-
pute analogies between domains that are described by
classical rst-order formulas (GKS06). HDTP's match-
ing algorithm is based on the syntactic representation
and analogies are computed as mappings of formula sets
induced by their domain axiomatizations (SKKG09).
This approach ts into the classical paradigm of sym-
bol processing, where operations are performed on a
symbolic level in a way that a coherent semantic in-
terpretation can be provided. However, from this per-
spective, the framework remains incomplete, until a se-
mantic characterization of the syntactic operations is
provided.
In this paper, we will show, that the syntactic map-
ping procedure of HDTP can be given a sensible inter-
pretation on the semantic side. Not only, the syntactic
mapping can be shown to induce a mapping between
models (this was already shown in (GKKS07)), but
furthermore, the generalized formulas constructed by
HDTP during the mapping process can be interpreted
as a new, abstract domain theory, which can be given
a model theoretic semantics. To our knowledge this is
the rst concrete approach to make the semantics of
analogy making formally precise.
The paper has the following structure. First, we
will sketch the syntactic basis of HDTP and the chal-
lenges of developing a semantics for HDTP, then we will
sketch the theory of institutions. We will continue with
describing an institution theoretic analysis of analogy
making. Finally, we will sketch an example and we will
add some concluding remarks.
Heuristic-Driven Theory Projection
The Theory in a Nutshell
HDTP is a framework for discovering analogous struc-
tures of pairs of logical theories. In this section, we
sketch the main ideas of the syntactic anti-unication
process of HDTP. For a thorough introduction to the
syntactic principles of HDTP, the reader is referred to
(SKKG09).
 Two sets of formulas AxS and AxT are provided as
input specifying an axiomatization of the source and
target domain, respectively. Each axiomatization de-
scribes (some aspects) of a domain of knowledge.
These sets of formulas AxS and AxT induce corre-
sponding theories ThS and ThT (i.e. the deductive
closure of AxS and AxT).
 A pair of clauses cS 2 ThS and cT 2 ThT is selected
and (syntactically) generalized by anti-unication to
a clause cG.2 For generalization, domain symbols
2Anti-unication can be understood as the dual construc-
tion of unication, i.e. instead of computing the most gen-
eral unier, the most specic (least general) generalization
of terms and formulas is computed. Anti-unication was
introduced by Plotkin (Plo70).
{ can be kept, if they occur in both domains (e.g. a
relation symbol >)
{ can be generalized into a new variable, e.g. sun,
nucleus are generalized to an individual variable X
in the famous Rutherford analogy describing the
analogy between the solar system and the atom
model
{ can be dropped by an \argument insertion" sub-
stitution, i.e. symbols are \integrated" into a com-
plex function.
As a by-product, the computed generalization pro-
vides a pair of substitutions h;i with cG = cS
and cG = cT. In other words, the source and tar-
get clauses cs and cT can be gained by applying the
substitutions to the corresponding generalized clause
cG, respectively.
 A set AxG of generalized clauses is incrementally built
by repeating the described generalization step. This
set is considered to be good, if it has a low substitu-
tion complexity and a high degree of coverage3
 The substitutions belonging to a (good) set of gen-
eralizations can be used to establish an analogical
relation
 Based on this relation, formulas of the source domain
that are not anti-unied yet can be transferred (pro-
jected) to the target domain in order to allow new
conceptualizations of the target.
Challenges
There are several challenges of this approach if one
wants to develop a model theoretic semantics for HDTP.
First, the generalized expression AxG are not necessar-
ily rst-order logical formulas (FOL formulas). The
anti-unication process may result in a second-order
generalization, for example, by introducing a relation
or function variable. Second, the variables introduced
by anti-unication might be treated dierently than or-
dinary (universally quantied) variables. In particu-
lar, second-order variables can be interpreted as exis-
tentially quantied in order to prevent inconsistencies
or they need to get a treatment as described below.
Third, the question arises how an adequate notion for
a \model" (in the logical model theoretic sense) of the
resulting analogy might look like.
Here are the basic ideas of the present approach: In
(GKS06), it is proposed, that the generalized terms can
be seen as axioms of a generalized theory. A framework
is sketched that integrates a semantics for the ana-
logical relation and the generalized theory. However,
some questions are left open and especially the status
of the variables introduced by anti-unication remains
3Coverage is the concept that \measures" the degree of
specicity of a generalization. Intuitively, we can say that an
anti-unier <AxG;; > has at least the same coverage as
the anti-unier <Ax
0
G;
0;
0> if there exists a substitution
 : Ax
0
G ! AxG, such that 
0 =    and 
0 =   .
Compare (SKKG09) for the details of this concept.unclear. If these generalized symbols would be con-
sidered as logical variables, the resulting formulas leave
the realm of rst-order logic, as anti-unication can also
generalize function and predicate symbols. Therefore,
we propose to see the generalized symbols not as vari-
ables, but as elements of a new vocabulary. The gener-
alized theory is then a classical rst-order theory with
formulas built from these symbols. The substitutions
induce a mapping between the generalized theory and
the domain theories.
An Institutional View on Analogies
To make these ideas more precise, we will use the lan-
guage of the theory of institutions (GB92).4 Institu-
tions provide a framework to describe model theory at
an abstract level using methods from category theory.
Informally, an institution consists of a collection of sig-
natures Sign and to each signature , rst the collec-
tion Sen() of all -sentences is assigned. In the case
of FOL, the -sentences correspond to the set of all
FOL formulas that can be built using symbols from .
Second, for each signature  the collection Mod()
of all -models is assigned. In the case of FOL, this
collection correspond to all possible interpretations of
symbols from . The -models and -sentences are re-
lated by the relation of -satisfaction, usually denoted
by j=.
A central idea of the theory of institutions is, that
truth is invariant under the change of notation. Within
an institution, signatures can be mapped to other sig-
natures by so called signature morphisms, i.e. struc-
ture preserving functions. In FOL, this translates into
the constraint that arity and sortal restrictions have
to match. A signature morphism f :  ! 0 induces
functions Sen(f) : Sen() ! Sen(0) and Mod(f) :
Mod(0) ! Mod() which have to be consistent with
-satisfaction as specied by the following contravari-
ant satisfaction constraint: for all ' 2 Sen() and
M0 2 Mod(0):
M0 j= Sen(f)(') , Mod(f)(M0) j= '
Every collection T of -sentences (called -theory)
determines a class of -models:
T = fM j M j= ' for all ' 2 Tg
Dually, every collection V of -models determines a
-theory:
V = f' j M j= ' for all M 2 Vg
As a natural consequence we get that the double ap-
plication of these operators provides the closure under
semantic entailment: T = T.
4For a thorough discussion of logic systems in the lan-
guage of the theory of institutions the reader is referred to
the monograph (Dia08).
The Generalized Theory
We now describe HDTP within the framework of in-
stitutions, more precisely, within the institution FOL.
The new variables introduced by the process of anti-
unication are placeholders, which are instantiated by
dierent terms on the source and target side. In what
follows, we will treat these variables as new symbols
which can be used as a signature for a generalized the-
ory of both domains. Using this idea we can give the
intuitive notion of \generalized theory" a formal mean-
ing.
The signature G will consist of all symbols used in
the generalized formulas AxG, i.e. symbols from S \
T and the variables introduced by anti-unication.
The generalized formulas AxG are then ordinary rst-
order formulas over the signature G in the usual sense.
The theory spanned by these formulas will be called (as
above) the generalized theory ThG(AxG).5
The generalized axioms AxG are related to the ax-
iomatizations AxS and AxT of the source and target
domain by the the following relations
AxG  (AxS)
 and AxG  (Ax)

with  and  being the substitutions computed by
HDTP. The application of the substitutions  and
 denes mappings  : Sen(G) ! Sen(S) and
 : Sen(G) ! Sen(T). It can be shown that these
mappings can be restricted to the respective theories,
i.e. that j : (AxG)
 ! (AxS)
 and j : (AxG)
 !
(AxT)
. However, in general the induced mappings are
not theory morphisms in the sense of (GB92), as there
are no underlying signature morphisms. To overcome
this problem, we will extend the original domain signa-
tures S and T.
Substitutions
In the setting of HDTP, there exists a set of (higher-
order) generalized formulas, which can be instantiated
via substitution to domain formulas over given signa-
tures. We will describe this situation in terms of signa-
tures and signature morphisms.
Let Ax be a set of (higher-order) formulas and  be
a substitution such that Ax is a set of (rst-order)
formulas over some signature . Now we can dene a
signature  which allows to interpret the formulas Ax
as rst-order formulas as follows:
(i) We extend  by taking into account the pairs X=t
in  and by introducing a new symbol X for each
such pair. Notice, that there is an obvious embed-
ding  ,! .
(ii) A system of equations and equivalences is used to
relate new symbols in  to those in .
5From now on we will use Th(Ax) to denote the clo-
sure under semantic entailment of an axiomatization Ax re-
stricted to sentences over a signature , i.e. Th(Ax) =
(Ax)
 \ Sen().Consider again a substitution  as above. We can
dene a set of -formulas Def as follows:6
Pair in substitution  Formula in Def
X=c X = X
F=f1  :::  fn 8 xF( x) = F( x)
P=p P $ p
P=p(f1  :::  fn) 8 xP( x) $ P( x)
The idea is, that Def provides a description that
allows the application of substitutions as a logical de-
duction in the HDTP algorithm. One can make this
more precise by noticing the following fact: If Ax;;
are given as above, then the following two facts hold:
 Th(Ax [ Def) \ Sen() = Th(Ax).
 There is a (natural) isomorphism
Mod(Ax [ Def)
 =   ! Mod(Ax).
The crucial point is, that the additional newly in-
troduced symbols do not allow to derive new sentences
in Sen(). Notice that they cannot introduce inter-
relations between existing symbols provided that these
additional symbols are really new. On the semantic
level, the additional symbols do not provide new mod-
els, as the interpretations of these symbols are fully
constrained by the formulas from Def.
Coverage
Usually, an analogy does not establish a complete map-
ping between two domains. Quite often only parts of
the domains are associated with each other. This fact
can be used to motivate the concept of coverage in
HDTP. A domain formula ' from Sen() is said to
be covered by an analogy i ' 2 Th(AxG), i.e.  is
either an instantiation of a generalized formula or can
be derived from such instantiations. The set Th(AxG)
is called the part of the domain that is covered by the
generalization (or analogy).
Assume that AxD is a set of domain axioms over
some signature , AxG a set of generalized formulas,
 a substitution that instantiates AxG in Sen(), i.e.
AxG  Th(AxD). Then one can easily observe that
the following relations (i) - (iv) hold:
(i) Th(AxG)  Th(AxD)
(ii) Th(AxG [ Def) \ Sen() = Th(AxG)
(iii) Th(AxG [ Def) \ Sen()  Th(AxD)
(iv) Th(AxG [ Def [ AxD) \ Sen() = Th(AxD)
The rst formula just states that all covered formulas
are domain formulas, a necessary condition to call AxG
6The -formulas Def are naturally induced by the the-
ory of \restricted higher-order anti-unication" as described
in (SKKG09).
a generalization of the domain. The second formula
describes the covered part of the domain theory as a
(subset of) the closure under semantic entailment of
AxG [ Def. The third formula is a trivial consequence
from (i) and (ii). The fourth formula states that adding
AxG[Def does not change the set of entailed formulas
in Sen(). It is an immediate consequence of (iii).
Using the contravariant satisfaction constraint of the
theory of institutions, we can characterize the corre-
sponding model classes as dual statements of the above
results as follows:
(i) Mod(AxG)  Mod(AxD)
(ii) Mod(AxG [ Def)  = Mod(AxG)
(iii) Mod(AxG [ Def)  - Mod(AxD) is injective.
(iv) Mod(AxG [ Def [ AxD)  = Mod(AxD)
The crucial point is again, that we have no choice
when interpreting the new symbols, as their value is
determined by the dening equations from Def.
Describing Analogies
We will now turn to analogies and their description
in HDTP. The starting point is given by two domain
axiomatizations AxS and AxT over signature S and
T, respectively. HDTP will then compute a set of
generalized formulas AxG and substitutions ; such
that ThS(AxG)  ThS(AxS) and ThT(AxG) 
ThT(AxT). Following the HDTP process described
above we can construct signatures S; and T; such
that AxG are rst-order formulas over these signa-
tures. We set G = S; \ T; and conclude that
AxG  Sen(G).
For the following discussion we introduce some ab-
breviations:

+
S := S [ G and 
+
T := T [ G
Then the sets of equations Def and Def are formulas
over 
+
S and 
+
T, respectively. Furthermore, we will set
Ax
+
S := AxS [ Def and Ax
+
T := AxT [ Def. We have
the following inclusion relations between signatures:
G p
!! B B B B B B B B Nn
}}||||||||
S
  // 
+
S 
+
T T ? _ oo
These signature inclusions induce inclusions on the
syntactic level (notice that we work in the institution
FOL):
Sen(S)  _

Sen(G)  s
&& L L L L L L L L L L Kk
yyrrrrrrrrrr
Sen(T)  _

Sen(
+
S) Sen(
+
T)
Dually the above signature inclusions induce the in-
verse inclusions on the semantic level:Mod(S) Mod(G) Mod(T)
Mod(
+
S)
OO 88 p p p p p p p p p p p
Mod(
+
T)
ffNNNNNNNNNNN
OO
We will now examine the subsets of these sets, that
are associated with the domain theories. Compare Fig-
ure 1 for these subset relations. The claim that iS and
iT are inclusions, follows from
(Ax
+
S [ AxG)

= (Ax
+
S)

On the semantic level~ S and~ T are isomorphisms (even
though jS and jT are not), while~ S and~ T are in general
neither injective nor surjective.
Analogical Relation
Given the considerations so far, we can dene the fol-
lowing mappings (cf. Figure 1):
mS : (AxS)
 ! (AxG)
 and
mT : (AxT)
 ! (AxG)

by mS = ~ S  ~ 
 1
S and mT = ~ T  ~ 
 1
T . Given mod-
els MS 2 (AxS) and MT 2 (AxT), for every symbol
x 2 G we get two interpretations mS(MS)(x) 2 US
and mT(MT)(x) 2 UT. Associating those elements es-
tablishes the analogical relation. Briey, this is the idea
to relate MS(x)  MT(x) which corresponds to the
relation x  x on the syntactic level. Clearly, it is
possible to extend this association to terms and even
formulas.
Example: Heat Flow
It might be worth to spell out these ideas in an exam-
ple. We have chosen the heat ow analogy, which mod-
els the creation of new concepts \heat" and \heat ow"
by analogical inference, given a model of water ow as
the source domain. In the context of HDTP, this anal-
ogy seems to be especially interesting as it makes some
complex mappings necessary. For a detailed discussion
of the computation compare (SKKG09)).
We will follow (GB92) and describe signatures by two
sets: function symbols and predicate symbols, both an-
notated with arity. So we start with the following do-
main signatures and axiomatizations:
S =

fheight=2;in=2;water=0;beaker=0;vial=0;
t1=0;t2=0g;f> =2g
	
AxS =

height(water in beaker;t1) >
height(water in vial;t1) ! (t1 > t2)
^ height(water in beaker;t1) >
height(water in beaker;t2)
^ height(water in vial;t2) >
height(water in vial;t1);
:::
	
The signatures S of the source domain provides the
vocabulary to describe the ow of water in two con-
nected vessels, a beaker and a vial. Due to space re-
striction we have only depicted one particular fact from
the axiomatization: if the water level in the beaker is
higher than the water level in the vial at a given time
point t1, then for every subsequent observation the wa-
ter level will decline in the beaker while it will increase
in the vial. For the target domain we provide the fol-
lowing axiomatization:
T =

ftemp=2;in=2;coee=0;cup=0;cube=0;
t1=0;t2=0g;f> =2g
	
AxT =

temp(coee in cup;t1) > temp(cube;t1)
! (t1 > t2)
^ temp(coee in cup;t1) >
temp(coee in cup;t2)
^ temp(cube;t2) > temp(cube;t1);
:::
	
The vocabulary provides elements to describe a situ-
ation in which a cup of hot coee, when connected with
an cold ice cube, will cool down, while the ice warms
up. From this axiomatization, HDTP will compute the
set of generalized formulas:
AxG =

E(X;t1) > E(Y;t1)
! (t1 > t2)
^ E(X;t1) > E(X;t2)
^ E(Y;t2) > E(Y;t1);
:::
	
and substitutions
 = fE=u;v:height(water in u;v);X=beaker;Y=vialg
 = fE=u;v:temp(u;v);X=coee in cup;Y=cubeg
The formulas in AxG are (higher-order) formulas over
the signature
S \ T =

ft1=0;t2=0g; f> =2g
	
with generalization variables E;X;Y . Now, inter-
preting these variables (that occur in the domain sub-
stitutions) as new symbols, we get an extended signa-
ture:
G =

fE=2;X=0;Y=0;t1=0;t2=0g; f> =2g
	
The dening equations Def and Def are con-
structed as sets of formulas over the signatures 
+
G[S
and 
+
G [ T, respectively:(AxG)

 s
iT
%% K K K K K K K K K Kk
iS
yysssssssss
j=
(AxS)
 
jS
//
j=
(Ax
+
S)

j=
(AxG)
 (Ax
+
T)

j=
(AxT)
 ? _
jT
oo
j=
(AxS)
 (Ax
+
S)

~ S
99 t t t t t t t t t t
~ S
oo (Ax
+
T)

~ T
eeJJJJJJJJJJ
~ T
// (AxT)

Figure 1: Subset relations that are associated with the domain theories.
Def = f 8u;v : E(u;v) = height(water in u;v);
X = beaker;Y = vial g
Def = f 8u;v : E(u;v) = temp(u;v);
X = coee in cup;Y = cube g
As can be seen from these formulas, the complex ex-
pression height(water in u;v) on the source side corre-
sponds to the less complex term temp(u;v) on the target
side, while the complex expression coee in cup on the
target corresponds to the constant beaker on the source.
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose that analogy making can be
used for various applications in the AGI context. We
sketched the framework HDTP for analogy making that
is intended to compute a generalized theory of given in-
put source and target domains. The main contribution
of this paper is a new institution-based formal seman-
tics of the established analogical relation together with
the model theory of the computed generalized theory.
A classical example of analogy making is also roughly
sketched. Future work will be a complete specication
of the model theory of analogical relations, a represen-
tative set of worked out examples, and the discussion
of potential alternatives to the present approach.
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